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REMARKS
THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY
AND PUBLIC TRUST
CHANCELLOR WILLIAM B. CHANDLER, III*
It is daunting when a Chancery judge is surrounded by professors from
great legal institutions who often critique and write about our decisions. I
confess some trepidation that I may be graded on what I’m about to say, but
I hope that will not happen.
The Chancellor is the Chief Judge of the Court of Chancery. I do not
know how much you know about my court, but let me describe a little bit
about it. It is an old court by our standards, having been created over 217
years ago in 1792.1 Over that time, there have been thirty-seven judges who
have served on the Delaware Court of Chancery.2
In 1792, the Delaware Court of Chancery had a single Chancellor, one
individual, and it remained that way until the early 1940s, when the Legis-
lature added the first vice chancellor.3 Over time, as the court became bus-
ier and its reputation grew, it was expanded to five members: the chancellor
and four vice chancellors.4 The five members of the court handle all of the
cases, with each judge carrying about 250 cases. I assign the cases, as they
are filed, to individual judges; each judge handles his assigned cases from
cradle to grave, until they are concluded.
Now, the chancellor does not have many duties beyond those of the
vice chancellors. I have administrative functions and budgetary duties in
addition to my caseload. Having served as a vice chancellor once, I can tell
you that I like to compare the position of chancellor to being that of a
caretaker at a graveyard: I am over everyone, but no one listens to me.
* The Honorable William Chandler, III was appointed Chancellor of the Delaware Court of
Chancery in 1997 and has served on the bench for twenty years.
1. William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of
Chancery—1792–1992, in COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE—1792–1992
(1993), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/courts/Court%20of%20Chancery/?history.htm.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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It is, of course, a great honor and privilege to serve on the Delaware
Court of Chancery. So, when Professor Lyman Johnson called me and
asked me to speak about the particular subject that is the focus of today’s
program, he said, “Bill, I’d like you to talk about what the Court of Chan-
cery and other courts and judges might do to try to instill confidence and
trust in the public with respect to our financial institutions after what’s hap-
pened in this financial meltdown—the economic debacle we are now
experiencing.”
I immediately thought, “I doubt that I am the right person to address
this subject.” Courts, as you know, are specialized governmental institu-
tions, but they are reactionary in nature. They are not proactive. Courts do
not reach out to solve problems, to reform behavior, or to reform institu-
tions. We respond to problems that are brought to the courts, and we adjudi-
cate them, but in a limited and incremental fashion.
The goal of the court is really to earn respect and trust. Not to instill it
in others, but to earn the trust and respect of the public that we serve. We do
not have a standing army to carry out our orders. Thus, we rely on the
consent of those whom we direct either to pay civil damages, to disgorge
property, or to obey our injunctive orders. To achieve voluntary compliance
without an army requires you to have the respect and consent of those you
are directing and commanding.
Lizanne Thomas mentioned the business judgment rule and fiduciary
duties during her presentation. That is one of the reasons I enjoyed her talk,
and in the end she returned to the importance of doing what is right. That is
the charm, so to speak, of the Court of Chancery. Not only do we require
people to meet legal standards, legal rules that are announced in advance,
but we expect people—directors and managers usually—to behave in a way
that is fair and equitable. We have the power to strike down actions that
might be technically legal when those actions work an inequity or
unfairness.
Our corporate law in Delaware has one principal foundation, and that
is our corporate statute5—a statute both broad and enabling and that empha-
sizes self-ordering. It grants directors and managers of public companies
great discretion as to how they will deploy the assets of the company, the
latitude to choose, and the most efficient means to do so.6
Our law requires managers and directors to do two things: first, to
obey positive law and the statutory commands of the Delaware General
Corporation Law.7 Those latter commands are limited in number, such as
having an annual meeting of shareholders who will elect the board of direc-
5. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ch. 1 (2008).
6. Id. § 4.
7. Id.
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tors as well as stockholder approval of important transactions in the com-
pany’s life, such as a merger or dissolution.8
Second, beyond meeting these fundamental positive law and statutory
requirements, directors and managers must do something more: they must
comply with equitable principals known as their fiduciary duties.9 Fiduciary
duties are an ancient concept in our law, and one that the Delaware Court of
Chancery inherited from the English common law more than 300 years ago.
Only two words comprise “fiduciary duty,” but they have enormous
scope and significance. “Duty” can be traced etymologically to the Latin
verb debere, or “to owe,” signifying that an action is required, that some
affirmative conduct is expected or required.10 “Fiduciary” is a word that
traces its lineage back at least three or four centuries.
One of the earliest corporate law cases was by the Lord Chancellor of
England in 1742: the Sutton case.11 The Lord Chancellor was addressing
the actions of corporate directors before him. He said that directors, like
agents or trustees, were required to act with fidelity and reasonable dili-
gence.12 The word “fidelity” is another Latin-derived term that figures
prominently in our law.13
Fidelity, faithfulness, devotion, and loyalty: these are the words that
infuse Delaware’s fiduciary duty law. These terms encompass the second
standard that all corporate directors and managers must meet. To repeat,
they must meet not only the fundamental laws of the Delaware statute and
the regulatory laws of our nation, of course, but they must also satisfy the
requirements or demands of their fiduciary duties.
Now, the chancellors must explain the basis for every decision. There
are no juries in the Court of Chancery, so in every instance, we are person-
ally responsible for our decisions. Our opinions must carefully explain why
a director or manager has not lived up to his or her fiduciary responsibility.
Many academics have referred to the opinions of the Court of Chancery as
akin to parables; that is, they read like morality stories describing the be-
havior of directors and managers, both the good behavior and the bad.14
The academics have said—and I largely agree with them—that one can,
over time, weave these parables and stories together to form a road map, an
8. Id.
9. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
10. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 856 (11th ed. 2003).
11. Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 645 (Ch. 1742).
12. Id.
13. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S, supra note 10, at 465.
14. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of
Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573 (2005).
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acceptable path for directors and officers of companies, so they can know
what is expected of them.15
What do we mean by the terms “loyalty,” “fidelity,” “good faith,” “fair
dealing,” “honesty of purpose,” and “integrity”? We use these words delib-
erately in our opinions, but carefully and in context. They are repeated by
the financial and business press, who report our opinions and quote our
language. They are written about by professors. The lawyers who counsel
directors write client memos using the same language—the same strongly-
worded, moralistic terms—found in our opinions.
Then, in meetings with directors or officers of the company, these
same lawyers use the “parables” in an effort, we hope, to educate their
clients about what is expected in the way of appropriate behavior: what are
the appropriate standards of conduct in the business world, and what to do,
and what not to do, as a fiduciary.
These stories or “parables” are one method by which the court, as an
institution, tries to earn respect from its constituents and the public. In tell-
ing these stories, we are obligated to defend and rationally explain the deci-
sions we have reached and to persuade our audience that they are correct, as
well as fair, and sensible. That is, we must persuade that the result is just.
I would describe that goal as the first obligation of the opinion writing
exercise—to reach and defend a just result. The second function, though
less formal, is to educate and inform others, in addition to the parties before
us. Most people think that judicial decisions are aimed at the parties and
litigants who are before the court, and that is entirely true. But often, judges
are conscious of the fact that they are addressing a much broader audience
in the opinions than just the immediate litigants. Chancery judges realize
that our opinions will be explained to directors and officers of other compa-
nies, so we write with that educational function in the back of our minds.
These lessons, moreover, are transmitted in several ways. One way, as
I mentioned, is that the “parables” are told through client memos and law-
yers interacting with clients. Another is through the business press that cov-
ers our decisions. Yet another method is through the judges themselves
talking to directors. We frequently speak at directors’ colleges, where direc-
tors come to learn more about fiduciary duties and legal requirements.
We are not the only ones who do this, of course. There are many insti-
tutions that explain these principles to directors, but I think it is important
that the judges of my court, as well as the Delaware Supreme Court, make
the effort to explain the meaning and import of our decisions as an aspect of
our institutional duty.
15. See, e.g., DONALD J. WOLFE ET AL., NOTABLE DELAWARE CORPORATE DECISIONS 2005:
DELAWARE-CENTRIC MUSINGS ON DISNEY, TOYS “R” US, TCI, UNISUPER, AND EXAMEN, 1543
PL1/CORP 441 (2006).
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Now, another way in which judicial opinions operate to influence be-
havior is through an in terrorem effect. I have heard others say that direc-
tors are highly reputation-sensitive people. If they are reputation-sensitive,
then one might expect that judicial opinions will be taken to heart, because
the opinions are written in a personalized tone—personalized in the sense
that we call specific directors out. If you are a party in the case and you are
a named director, and your conduct falls below the standard and is either
unfair or inequitable—for example, acting in bad faith, disloyally, dishon-
estly, or fraudulently—your conduct is held up for all the world to see. We
do not use pseudonyms; we use the actual names of the directors, lawyers,
or other professionals involved.
Thus, by “naming names,” we obviously send a strong message. Some
view this as a form of “public censure.” Others refer to it as “shaming,”
which incentivizes or motivates others to avoid the same fate by avoiding
certain conduct and by recognizing the standards that will be applied to
them. There are other institutions besides the Court of Chancery that do the
very same thing. Institutional investors, for example, engage in similar
forms of public censure, as do activist shareholders and the business press.
In the brief time I have left, let me add a final note of caution about
this, however, because there are limits that courts should not exceed—or
which they ought not exceed—in the effort to educate or teach.
We are common law judges, and the common law grows incre-
mentally, decision by decision. There is danger in judges departing from the
historical common law tradition by making statements that sound too much
like proclamations or broad policy-like statements. In doing so, judges
leave their proper domain—and where their institutional legitimacy is most
secure—and cross into the sphere of legislators and regulators.
Common law judges must be careful not to reach out to decide or
comment on issues beyond the case before them. Rather, we must decide
each case, and only that case, based on its own facts and circumstances. We
can employ a moralistic tone in an opinion, and we can use terms such as
“good faith,” “fidelity,” “loyalty,” “honesty,” and “devotion”—words that
have powerful moral connotations. But such words must be deployed delib-
erately and carefully in specific circumstances, where justified; one must be
careful not to over-use such language or risk diminishing its force.
Let me leave you with a final thought: while judges can employ fiduci-
ary duty language to shape behavior, its effectiveness really depends upon
the degree to which the court, as an institution, is respected. In other words,
the court’s success in reforming behavior depends on the degree to which
those who are the object of such reforms respect and honor the institution.
This circles back to my initial point about the primary objective of judges
being to protect the reputation of the institution on which they serve. You
do that by being mindful of a judge’s proper role.
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The five judges on the Court of Chancery know the great history and
reputation of the court, built over two hundred years. We all consider our
positions as a sacred trust that has been granted to each of us at this moment
in history, a trust that we will eventually pass on to those who will come
after us. And our job is to protect it and preserve it, and to ensure that the
court’s reputation is enhanced, and not diminished, during our trusteeship.
That is how I envision the judges of the Delaware Court of Chancery,
as Lizanne Thomas was saying, “doing the right thing.” When we do the
right thing, we will earn the respect and trust of the lawyers, and the busi-
nessmen and businesswomen, and the general public whose respect and
consent form the foundation of the Court of Chancery. It is in this process
that we help shape and restore public confidence in our institutions, whether
they are financial or legal institutions.
